|

Recent
Stories
April
29, 2003
Gary
Leupp
Disorder and Opportunity: the Results
of the Iraq War
Uri
Avnery
Don't Envy Abu-Mazen
Anthony
Gancarski
Brush with the Law
Mickey
Z.
POWs: Then and Now
CounterPunch
Wire
How to Spin Israel on the Hill: Internal Lobbying Documents
Robert
Fisk
Did the US Murder Journalists?
Chris
Floyd
Bush Telegraphs His Punches on Syria
Wayne Madsen
About Those Iraqi Intelligence Documents
Wallace
Gagne
Pilgrimage or Demolition Derby?
Eliot Katz
Playing Catch with Cracked Globes
Steve
Perry
Bush's War Web Log 4/29
April
28, 2003
Ann
Harrison
Fighting Back: Medical Marijuana
Patients Sue Ashcroft
Robert
Jensen
Lack of WMD Kills the Case for War
Peter Phillips
Total Information Control
Ron
Jacobs
Get the US Out of Iraq and Its Military Out of Our Minds
Mark Hand
Peace Park: The Pentagon Solution
to a Baseball Stadium Dilemma
Linda
S. Heard
Repeat After Me: Iraq is Weapons Free
Kurt Nimmo
US Military Bases: the Spoils and
Deceptions of War
Steve
Perry
Bush's War Web Log 4/28
April
26 / 27, 2003
Elaine
Cassel
The Other War: Bush, Ashcroft and
the End of Civil Liberties
Saul
Landau
Iraq War: a Policy of Christian and Jewish Fundamentalism
William
A. Cook
Sharon Recruits US as Mercenaries Against Syria
William
S. Lind
Now the Real War Starts
John Chuckman
In Jesus's Name:
Franklin Graham's Christian Empire
David
MacMichael and Ray McGovern
Ex-CIA Analysts on WMD: Where? Find?
Plant?
Gary Leupp
Why the War on Iraq was (and Remains) Wrong
Robert
Sandels
Cuba Crackdown: a Revolt Against Bush's National Security Strategy?
CounterPunch
Wire
An Open Letter to Jerry Brown on Oakland Police Violence Against
Peace Activists and Dock Workers
Mickey
Z.
Our Ba'athists
Anthony
Gancarski
Nader Plays Pullman
Scott
Handleman
The Mumia Abu-Jamal Case in Its True Colors
Claud Cockburn
Evelyn Waugh's Ear Trumpet
Poets'
Basement
Matt Simon, Sam Hamod, Hammond Guthrie and Stew Albert
Steve
Perry
Bush's War Web Log 4/26
April
25, 2003
David
Vest
It's Not the Oil; It's the Art!
Steven
Higgs
All About Tucker Carlson
Walt
Brasch
The Shock and Awe of American Ignorance
Alexander
Cockburn
The Decline of American Journalism:
the Case of Judy Miller
Zeynep
Toufe
A Letter to the People of Iraq from an Anti-War Activist
CounterPunch
Wire
Season of the Witch: Jeane Kirkpatrick Unbound
Hammond
Guthrie
Springtime in Iraq
Steve
Perry
Bush's War Web Log 4/25
Website
of the Day
Having
a Great Time, Wish You Were Here: Postcards from a War
April
24, 2003
Lois
Whitman
An Open Letter to Rumsfeld on the
Child Detainees at Guantanamo
Uri
Avnery
Abu vs. Abu: It's Not About Egos
David
Lindorff
Day Care in the Name of National Security? About Those Kids in
Camp X-Ray
John Grebe
Rev. Pat Robertson's Message in the Temple
Dokhi
Fassihian
Monster.Com: Ethnic Cleansing on the Web?
CounterPunch
Wire
Israeli Army Chief Threatens Peace Activists
Sam
Hamod
Our Man in Baghdad
Annie
C. Higgins
Do You Regret Being an American?
Harold
A. Gould
Will They Hate Us Forever?
Stew Albert
Big Brother in Bed
Steve
Perry
Bush's War Web Log 4/24
Website
of the Day
Muscles
Abroad
April
23, 2003
Anthony
Gancarski
When Young Mothers Die in Combat
Chris
Floyd
Desolation Row: Bush's Barbarians Teach
by Example
Marjorie
Cohn
Tax the War Profiteers
William
Lind
The Fourth Generation of Modern War
Dave Marsh
Nina Simone: Freedom Singer
Binoy
Kampmark
Malayasia's America: the War on Iraq
David Vest
Who's Looting Whom?
Standard
Shaefer
Super Imperialism: an Interview with Michael Hudson
Andrew
Rodman
Lawn Poem
Steve
Perry
Bush's War Web Log 4/23
Website
of the Day
Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East
April
22, 2003
Edward
Said
The Appalling Consequences of the Iraq
War are Now Clear
Sam
Hamod
What's the Deal with This War?
Kurt
Nimmo
Shi'a Will to Power
Gary
Leupp
At last! The Necessary Evidence
Carl
Estabrook
Oblivious Americans: They Distort,
We Subside
John
Stanton
Iran's Reza Pahlavi: a Puppet of the US and Israel?
Ramzy
Baroud
What Else Hasn't Israel Told America?
Steven
Sherman
About That Cuba Letter
Wayne Madsen
Bush's "Christian" Blood Cult
Stew
Albert
Creep
Steve
Perry
Bush's War Web Log 4/22
Website
of the Day
Critical Media Literacy in Times of War
April
21, 2003
Elaine
Cassel
An Administration in Contempt
Gary
Leupp
Easter Thoughts on Liberation, Jesus
and Kanaka WaiWai
Roger
Witherspoon
Why Michigan Needs Affirmative Action
Uri Avnery
At Midnight, a Knock on the Door
Col. Dan
Smith
Early Lessons from Iraq
Jo
Freeman
After the Protest Comes Politics
Michael
Berry
The Friedman Absurdities
Gray
Brechin
Hang Black Banners: Mourning the Cultural Loss
Bob Riedel
The Taliban from Texas
Steve
Perry
Bush's War Web Log 4/21
April
19, 2003
Gary
Leupp
The Rape of History
Saul
Landau
Shop, Go to Church, Support Bush's
War, Wait for Armageddon
Michael
J. Fellows
Off With Their Heads: the Constitution According to Scalia
Pablo
Mukherjee
Roadmap to Resistance
Omar
Barghouti
Sharon's Bloody Beat
Anthony
Gancarski
Tony Blair: the Most Powerful Man in the World
Mickey
Z.
Animals: the Other Collateral Damage
Will
Potter
When Police Attack Journalists
William
MacDougall
America's In-Bedded Journalism
Neve
Gordon
Haunted by History
Adam
Engel
Wal-Mart and Peace
Dr.
Susan Block
Art Bombs: American Libertines for Peace
Poets'
Basement
Albert, Buono, Guthrie
Steve
Perry
War Web Log 4/19
Song of
the Weekend
Baghdad to Basra
April
18, 2003
Uri
Avnery
Operation "Syrian Freedom":
This One's Not About Oil
Jorge
Mariscal
"They Died Trying to Become
Students": the Future of Latinos in an Era of War and Occupation
Mickey
Z:
Coalition of the Unindicted: Only Losers Get Tried for War Crimes
Hussein
Ibish
Syria and the Road to World War IV
Reza Ladjevardian
Tarqeting Iran? Do It With TV, Not Cruise Missiles
Matania
Ben-Artzi
You Are Not Protecting My Son's Rights: a Letter to the President
of Israel's Supreme Court
Bruce Jackson
Jews Like Us
Joe
Allen
My Lai Revisited
Carl Estabrook
Support Our Euphemism
Steve
Perry
War Web Log 4/18
Website
of the Day
Meet the Victims of War
April
17, 2003
Jeffrey
St. Clair
Patriot Gore: the Fatal Flaws in
the Patriot Missile System
Joanne
Mariner
Looting Antiquity: the Legal Implications
for the Pentagon
Issam
Nashashibi
Zalmay Khalilzad: the Neocon's Bagman
to Baghdad
Wayne Madsen
Another Sign of the "End Times" for American Journalism
Robert
Fisk
The Army of Occupation
Boris
Kagarlitsky
Virtual Saddam Takes Aim
Biljana
Vankovska
A Personal View of Iraq: Where
is the Truth?
Dan Brook
Oil War: Fueling the Empire
Stanley
Heller
Bomb and Steal: This is What Privatization Looks Like
Tim Robbins
A Chill Wind is Blowing Through This Nation
Harold
A. Gould
Iraq After the War
Steve
Perry
War Web Log 4/17
Hot Stories
Elaine
Cassel
Civil Liberties
Watch
Michel
Guerrin
Embedded Photographer Says: "I
Saw Marines Kill Civilians"
Uzma
Aslam Khan
The Unbearably Grim Aftermath of War:
What America Says Does Not Go
Paul de Rooij
Arrogant
Propaganda
Gore Vidal
The
Erosion of the American Dream
Francis Boyle
Impeach
Bush: A Draft Resolution
Click Here
for More Stories.
|
April 30,
2003
The Age of Unilateral War
Iraq, the United
States and the End of the European Coalition
By GABRIEL KOLKO
The disintegration of the Soviet
bloc permitted American unilateralism on a scale the modern world
has never seen. But with its war against Iraq the United States
for the first time openly massed its military power and then
invaded another nation, justifying the war in the name of the
elimination of weapons of mass destruction and "regime change."
At the same time, it staked the very future of its existing alliances--NATO
above all--but also the United Nations. NATO's demise is a major
outcome of the war against Iraq.
Washington intended to
recast its European alliance, especially after its war against
Serbia in the spring of 1999 revealed that the NATO principle
of unanimity among its 19-members was a major inhibition on its
freedom of action, but today its European coalition is disintegrating
prematurely for reasons it both failed to anticipate and deplores.
Despite its military
success, the Afghan war was a political failure for the U.S.
The country is today ruled by warlords, its economy is in shambles,
and even the Taliban is again attracting followers. The U. S.
has never been able to translate its superior arms into political
success, and that decisive failure is inherent in everything
it attempts. Iraq is very likely to confirm
this pattern; its regionalism and internecine ethnic strife will
produce years of instability. Rational assessments of these repeated
political failures would lead America to act far less frequently,
and its vision consciously excludes alliances that will inhibit
its actions.
The war with Iraq is
only the first step in the United States' astonishingly ambitious
project to recast the world. It has identified Iraq, Iran, and
North Korea as members of an "axis of evil." Even today
there is growing and formidable pressure on the Bush Administration
to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities, thereby courting an even
broader regional war. But as its "Nuclear Posture Review"
to Congress made clear in January 2002, Syria and Libya are also
"immediate" dangers, while China and even Russia "remain
a concern." The Iraq war is the beginning of a cycle.
On September 19, 2002
Bush proclaimed the United States' commitment to fighting "pre-emptive"
wars against "rogue states" that have weapons of mass
destruction or harbor "terrorists." His vision extends
far beyond the constraints inherent in alliances, much less agreeing
to conform to the decisions of the United Nations. This "new"
era in international relations, with momentous implications for
war and world peace, in fact began long before then, but it was
inevitable that the unilateralists now in charge of America's
foreign policy bring it to its logical conclusion.
Washington has decided
that its allies must now accept its objectives and work solely
on its terms, and it has no intention whatsoever of discussing
the merits of its actions in NATO conferences. This applied,
above all, to the war against Iraq--a war of choice.
The U. S. submitted the
Iraq issue to the UN Security Council only because of a vain
effort by Secretary of State Colin Powell to stem the unilateralism
of the dominant entourage around President Bush, but the entire
crisis revealed the impotence of traditionalists in the State
Department. The Americans based their case for military action
on the alleged existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) as well as Hussein's purported links with Al Qaeda terrorists.
But Israeli intelligence reported to the U.S. that Hussein had
no ties whatsoever to Bin Laden. The CIA concurred, and many
of its analysts complained publicly that the White House was
forcing them to lie on this issue.
As for WMD, the UN inspectors
did not find any and the CIA was convinced that by 1995 Hussein
had few, if any, left. Much more important, he did not use them
against the invading American army, which so far has not found
any. The single most important U.S. public justification for
the Iraq war proved to be an utter falsehood. This catastrophic
lie will haunt the U.S. for years to come, because although it
proved in Iraq that it militarily could quickly defeat what was,
at best, a second-rate army, it has no political credibility
whatsoever. France saw the issue as primarily one of the rule
of agreed international law in guiding international affairs
of all nations, and regarded American behavior as both arbitrary
and unilateral. To this extent, the Iraq crisis was broader and
impinges directly on NATO's future. The French and German refusal
to support what was an obvious American obsession to eliminate
a regime that it ( and Israel) deplored was vindicated, although
the Security Council could not constrain arbitrary and dangerous
American action. But it embarked on war anyway. Its real goal
was political--regime change--and it is the beginning of a cycle
of interventions that may last years; its ultimate consequences
are utterly unpredictable.
The crisis in NATO was
both overdue and inevitable, the result of a decisive American
reorientation, and the time and ostensible reason for it was
far less important than the underlying reason it occurred: the
U.S.' growing realization after the early 1990s that while NATO
was militarily a growing liability it still remained a political
asset. The United Nations and Security Council was strained in
ways that proved decisive but the U.S. never assigned the UN
the same crucial role as it did its alliance in Europe. The Iraq
war was the final step in NATO's demise.
Today, NATO's original
raison d'être for imposing American hegemony--which was
to prevent the major European nations from pursuing independent
foreign policies--is now the core of the controversy that is
now raging. Washington cannot sustain this grandiose objective
because a reunited Germany is far too powerful to be treated
as it was a half-century ago, and Germany has its own interests
in the Middle East and Asia to protect. Germany and France's
independence was reinforced by wholly inept American propaganda
on the relationship of Iraq to Al-Qaeda (from which the CIA and
British MI6 openly distanced themselves), overwhelming antiwar
public opinion in most nations, and a great deal of opposition
within the U. S. establishment and many senior American officers
to the war with Iraq. The furious American response to Germany,
France, and Belgium's refusal, under article 4 of the NATO treaty,
to protect Turkey from an Iraqi counterattack because that would
prejudge the Security Council's decision on war and peace was
only a contrived reason for confronting fundamental issues that
have simmered for years. The dispute was far more about symbolism
than substance, and the point was made: some NATO members refused
to allow the organization to serve as a rubber stamp for American
policy, whatever it may be.
Turkey's problem was
simple: the U. S. pressured it, despite overwhelmingly antiwar
Turkish public and political opinion, to allow American troops
to invade Iraq from Turkey--in effect, to enter the war on its
side. The U.S. wanted NATO to aid Turkey in order to strengthen
the Ankara government's resolve to ignore overwhelmingly antiwar
domestic opinion. The arms it was to receive were superfluous.
But the Turks have always been far more concerned with Kurdish
separatism in Iraq rekindling the civil war that Kurds have fought
in Turkey for much of the past decade, and the conditions they
demanded on these issues put Washington in a very difficult position
from which it could not extricate itself. The U.S. naively took
Turkey for granted, as it has for many decades, tying up its
most modern armor division offshore its coast on the assumption
it could also invade Iraq from the north. An important faction
of the government deliberately protracted negotiations with the
U.S. in the hope of preventing the war altogether.
Turkey's best--and most
obvious--defense was to stay out of the war, which the vast majority
of Turks wanted. After incessant haggling, it ended up doing
so, and its relations with the U. S. are now very strained, perhaps
irreparably. Meanwhile, tens of thousands Turkish troops are
massed at the Iraq border and they will march if the Kurds keep
Kirkuk, declare de facto independence, or in some way threaten
Turkish interests. A crisis may not occur in the coming weeks,
but it is a constant threat in the future. For the U.S. it is
a nightmare which can easily become reality.
Geopolitically, the consummately
ambitious American plan for restructuring the Middle East's politics,
making it more congenial to itself as well as to Israel, is very
likely to fail. Arab opinion--even among those once friendly
to the U.S.--was overwhelmingly antiwar and passionately angry,
a fact that will only increase terrorism's appeals and its dangers
to Americans and their allies. The vast majority of Arabs believe
that the outcome of the war on Iraq will be instability for the
entire region.
There is no longer an
Iraqi balance to Iranian predominance in the Gulf region, a fact
that has untold geopolitical implications. Saudi Arabia at the
end of April asked the United States to abandon its ultra-modern
bases quickly, which it has agreed to do, and the Saudis have
made a grudging move to make peace with the detested Iranian
Shia regime. Washington supported Hussein in his war with Iran
throughout the 1980s, providing him credits, intelligence, and
vital military support, solely to contain Iran, and now Iraq
is incapable of playing that role. Turkey is likely to intervene,
one way or another, to control the Kurds in northern Iraq--what
may occur there is wholly unpredictable and will be a vital question
in the years to come. But while America will very likely keep
a much larger military presence in the region for many years
to come, using Iran as an excuse, it cannot oppose the Turks
without shattering the illusion of its alliance with it--and
NATO. War with Iraq has created a vast number of uncontrollable
geopolitical dangers throughout the region.
Iran's role is of overwhelming
importance to the U.S.--and to Israel. It is militarily far more
formidable than Iraq and will have nuclear weapons in due course--the
timing is much disputed. Iran's principal concern is Israel,
its nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and Iran has neither
the intention nor the technology to reach beyond it. The obvious
solution is to create a nuclear-free zone enforced by international
inspection, an option Israel is most unlikely to accept.. "The
war in Iraq is just the beginning," former prime minister
Shimon Peres said on Israeli television last February. Will the
U.S. "drain the swamp" in the region, as the neoconservatives
advocate, even including Saudi Arabia among the regimes to be
toppled? Washington is divided on this specific issue but not
on the question of its commitment to an aggressive foreign policy
globally. What inhibits it most is Iraq's political chaos, which
it may increasingly feel obligated to resolve before it confronts
more wayward nations, and the immense costs of the American way
of making war--costs its former allies are unwilling to share.
The End of Alliances
America still desires
to regain the mastery over Europe it had during the peak of the
Cold War but it is also determined not to be bound by European
desires--or indeed by the overwhelming European public opposition
to the war with Iraq. Genuine dialogue or consultation with its
NATO allies is out of the question. The Bush Administration,
even more than its predecessors, simply does not believe in it--nor
will it accept NATO's formal veto structure; NATO's division
on Turkey has nothing to do with it. Washington cannot have it
both ways. Its commitment to aggressive unilateralism is the
antithesis of an alliance system that involves real consultation.
France and Germany are now far too powerful to be treated as
obsequious dependents, and the meeting at the end of April between
these two nations and Belgium--although still vague in its implications--is
an important step in the direction of NATO's breakup and the
creation of an autonomous bloc that Washington cannot control.
These states also believe in sovereignty, as does every nation
which is strong enough to exercise it, and they are now able
to insist that the United States both listen to and take their
views seriously. It was precisely this danger that the U.S. sought
to forestall when it created NATO over 50 years ago.
The controversy over
NATO's future has been exacerbated by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's
attacks on "Old Europe" and the disdain for Germany
and France that he and his close adviser, Richard Perle, have
repeated. But the underlying problems over the alliance's future
have been smoldering for years. Together, the nations that opposed
a preemptive American war in Iraq and the Middle East--an open-ended,
destabilizing adventure that is likely to last indefinitely--will
influence Europe's future development and role in the world profoundly.
Although they do not have armies comparable to the American,
they have great and growing economies. If Russia cooperates with
them, even only occasionally, they will be much more powerful,
and President Putin's support for their position on the war makes
that a real possibility.
Eastern European nations
may say what Washington wishes on Iraq, but economically they
are far more dependent on Germany and those allied with it. When
the 15 nations in European Union met last February 17 their statement
on Iraq was far closer to the German-French position than the
American, reflecting the antiwar nations' economic clout as well
as the response of some prowar political leaders to the massive
antiwar demonstrations that have taken place in Italy, Spain,
Britain and the rest of Europe. There is every likelihood that
the U.S. will emerge from this crisis in NATO more belligerent,
and more isolated and detested, than ever.
The Bush Administration
does not believe it needs allies, and this erroneous presumption
is changing the nature of global power and will lead to the U.
S. being isolated. It is folly to guess the next American move,
for the war in Afghanistan also destabilized Pakistan--a nuclear
power--and North Korea is high on the president's list of evil
states. Given its global ambitions and commitments, the U.S.
may very well be drawn elsewhere, and soon. The men who lead
it now are capable of anything.
The world has reached
the most dangerous point in recent history, one full of threats
of wars and instability unlike anything which prevailed when
a Soviet-led bloc existed. The war against Iraq and those very
likely to follow it are the logic of United States foreign and
military policies, one that assumes it has a near monopoly of
power, that emerged first after the collapse of Communism. The
Bush Administration has brought them to their inevitable culmination.
There should be no doubt
that the Cold War geopolitical legacies are ending and a new
configuration of nations is in the process of being created.
It is a mistake to think that America's quick defeat of the demoralized,
corrupt Iraqi regime reflects its new technological military
prowess rather than Hussein's political weakness. Rumsfeld wishes
to trumpet to strength of the Pentagon's arms but this conclusion
is scarcely justified by the facts. Military triumph, in any
case, can scarcely be equated with political success--and it
is politics that counts most in the long run.
The reality is that the
world is increasingly multipolar, economically and technologically,
and that the U.S.' desire to maintain absolute military superiority
over the world is a chimera. Russia remains a military superpower,
China is becoming one, and the world should have confronted and
stopped the proliferation of destructive weaponry 20 years ago.
It can only be done, if it is still possible, by international
accords and bodies--such as the UN--which the United States rejects
as a constraint on its power. The U.S. has no alternative but
to accept the world as it is, or prepare for doomsday.
Unfortunately, there
is not the slightest indication America will acknowledge the
limits of its aspirations. The crisis in NATO and the dissolution
of its dominant role in Europe reflects this diffusion of all
forms of power and the diminution of American hegemony, which
remains far more an unattainable aspiration than a reality.
Gabriel Kolko
is the leading historian of modern warfare. He is the author
of the classic Century
of War: Politics, Conflicts and Society Since 1914 and
Another
Century of War?. He can be reached at: kolko@counterpunch.org.
Today's
Features
Gary
Leupp
Disorder and Opportunity: the Results
of the Iraq War
Uri
Avnery
Don't Envy Abu-Mazen
Anthony
Gancarski
Brush with the Law
Mickey
Z.
POWs: Then and Now
CounterPunch
Wire
How to Spin Israel on the Hill: Internal Lobbying Documents
Robert
Fisk
Did the US Murder Journalists?
Chris
Floyd
Bush Telegraphs His Punches on Syria
Wayne Madsen
About Those Iraqi Intelligence Documents
Wallace
Gagne
Pilgrimage or Demolition Derby?
Eliot Katz
Playing Catch with Cracked Globes
Steve
Perry
Bush's War Web Log 4/29
Keep CounterPunch
Alive:
Make
a Tax-Deductible Donation Today Online!
home / subscribe
/ about us / books
/ archives / search
/ links /
|