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May
5, 2004
Article 15-6
Investigaton of 800th Military Police Brigade
US Army Report
on Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners
By Maj. Gen. ANTONIO M. TAGUBA
The report was prepared by
Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba on alleged abuse of prisoners by
members of the 800th Military Police Brigade at the Abu Ghraib
Prison in Baghdad.
It was ordered by Lt. Gen.
Ricardo Sanchez, commander of Joint Task Force-7, the senior
U.S. military official in Iraq, following persistent allegations
of human rights abuses at the prison.
ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION
OF THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
References ............................................................
...... 3
Background ............................................................
... 6
Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism
Interrogation and Detention Operations In Iraq (MG Miller's Assessment)..................................
8
IO Comments on MG Miller's
Assessment........... 8
Report on Detention and Corrections
In Iraq (MG Ryder's Report)....................................
9
IO Comments on MG Ryder's Report..................
12
Preliminary Investigative Actions
.................... 12
Findings and Recommendations
Part One (Detainee Abuse).
.............................. 15
Findings .................................................
15
Recommendations .................................
20
Part Two (Escapes and Accountability)
........ 22
Findings .................................................
22
Recommendations. ..............................
31
Part Three (Command Climate,
Etc...). ......... 34
Findings .............................................
... 36
Recommendations ...... ........................
44
Other Findings/Observations
........................... 49
Conclusion ................................................
............ 50
Annexes ............................................................
...... 51
References
Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949
3. Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949
4. Geneva Convention Protocol
Relative to the Status of Refugees, 1967
5. Geneva Convention Relative
to the Status of Refugees, 1951
6. Geneva Convention for the
Protection of War Victims, 12 August 1949
Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August
1949DOD Directive 5100.69, "DOD Program for Prisoners of
War and other Detainees," 27 December 1972DOD Directive
5100.77 "DOD Law of War Program," 10 July 1979STANAG
No. 2044, Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition
5), 28 June 1994STANAG No. 2033, Interrogation of Prisoners of
War (PW) (Edition 6), 6 December 1994AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners
of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees,
1 October 1997AR 190-47, The Army Corrections System, 15 August
1996
14. AR 190-14, Carrying of
Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties,
12 March 1993
15. AR 195-5, Evidence Procedures,
28 August 1992
16. AR 190-11, Physical Security
of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives, 12 February 1998
17. AR 190-12, Military Police
Working Dogs, 30 September 1993
18. AR 190-13, The Army Physical
Security Program, 30 September 1993
19. AR 380-67, Personnel Security
Program, 9 September 1988
20. AR 380-5, Department of
the Army Information Security, 31 September 2000
21. AR 670-1, Wear and Appearance
of Army Uniforms and Insignia, 5 September 2003
22. AR 190-40, Serious Incident
Report, 30 November 1993
23. AR 15-6, Procedures for
Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, 11 May 1988
24. AR 27-10, Military Justice,
6 September 2002
25. AR 635-200, Enlisted Personnel,
1 November 2000
26. AR 600-8-24, Officer Transfers
and Discharges, 29 June 2002
27. AR 500-5, Army Mobilization,
6 July 1996
28. AR 600-20, Army Command
Policy, 13 May 2002
29. AR 623-105, Officer Evaluation
Reports, 1 April 1998
30. AR 175-9, Contractors Accompanying
the Force, 29 October 1999
FM 3-19.40, Military Police
Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001FM 3-19.1, Military
Police Operations, 22 March 2001FM 3-19.4, Military Police Leaders'
Handbook, 4 March 2002 FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations,
19 June 2000FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and
Procedures, 5 May 1994FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28
September 1992FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, 25 November 198538.
FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001
39. FM 101-5, Staff Organizations
and Functions, 23 May 1984
40. FM 3-19.30, Physical Security,
8 January 2001
41. FM 3-21.5, Drill and Ceremonies,
7 July 2003
42. ARTEP 19-546-30 MTP, Mission
Training Plan for Military Police Battalion (IR)
43. ARTEP 19-667-30 MTP, Mission
Training Plan for Military Police Guard Company
44. ARTEP 19-647-30 MTP, Mission
Training Plan for Military Police Escort Guard Company
45. STP 19-95B1-SM, Soldier's
Manual, MOS 95B, Military Police, Skill Level 1, 6 August 2002
46. STP 19-95C14-SM-TG, Soldier's
Manual and Trainer's Guide for MOS 95C Internment/Resettlement
Specialist, Skill Levels 1/2/3/4, 26 March 1999
47. STP 19-95C1-SM MOS 95C,
Corrections Specialist, Skill Level 1, Soldier's Manual, 30 September
2003
48. STP 19-95C24-SM-TG MOS
95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill Levels 2/3/4, Soldier's Manual
and Trainer's Guide, 30 September 2003
49. Assessment of DOD Counter-Terrorism
Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq, (MG Geoffrey
D. Miller, Commander JTF-GTMO, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 9 September
2003
50. Assessment of Detention
and Corrections Operations in Iraq, (MG Donald J. Ryder, Provost
Marshal General), 6 November 2003
51. CJTF-7 FRAGO #1108, Subject:
includes- para 3.C.8 & 3.C.8.A.1, Assignment of 205 MI BDE
CDR Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility
(BCCF), 19 November 2003
52. CJTF-7 FRAGO #749, Subject:
Intelligence and Evidence-Led Detention Operations Relating to
Detainees, 24 August 2003
53. 800th MP BDE FRAGO # 89,
Subject: Rules of Engagement, 26 December 2003
54. CG CJTF-7 Memo: CJTF-7
Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, 12 October 2003
55. CG CJTF-7 Memo: Dignity
and Respect While Conducting Operations, 13 December 2003
56. Uniform Code of Military
Justice and Manual for Courts Martial, 2002 Edition
ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION
OF THE800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
BACKGROUND
1. (U) On 19 January 2004,
Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander, Combined
Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) requested that the Commander,
US Central Command, appoint an Investigating Officer (IO) in
the grade of Major General (MG) or above to investigate the conduct
of operations within the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade.
LTG Sanchez requested an investigation of detention and internment
operations by the Brigade from 1 November 2003 to present. LTG
Sanchez cited recent reports of detainee abuse, escapes from
confinement facilities, and accountability lapses, which indicated
systemic problems within the brigade and suggested a lack of
clear standards, proficiency, and leadership. LTG Sanchez requested
a comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry to make findings
and recommendations concerning the fitness and performance of
the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 2)
2. (U) On 24 January 2003,
the Chief of Staff of US Central Command (CENTCOM), MG R. Steven
Whitcomb, on behalf of the CENTCOM Commander, directed that the
Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), LTG
David D. McKiernan, conduct an investigation into the 800th MP
Brigade's detention and internment operations from 1 November
2003 to present. CENTCOM directed that the investigation should
inquire into all facts and circumstances surrounding recent reports
of suspected detainee abuse in Iraq. It also directed that the
investigation inquire into detainee escapes and accountability
lapses as reported by CJTF-7, and to gain a more comprehensive
and all-encompassing inquiry into the fitness and performance
of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 3)
3. (U) On 31 January 2004,
the Commander, CFLCC, appointed MG Antonio M. Taguba, Deputy
Commanding General Support, CFLCC, to conduct this investigation.
MG Taguba was directed to conduct an informal investigation under
AR 15-6 into the 800th MP Brigade's detention and internment
operations. Specifically, MG Taguba was tasked to:
a. (U) Inquire into all the
facts and circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee
abuse, specifically allegations of maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib
Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF));
b. (U) Inquire into detainee
escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically
allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib Prison;
c. (U) Investigate the training,
standards, employment, command policies, internal procedures,
and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate;
d. (U) Make specific findings
of fact concerning all aspects of the investigation, and make
any recommendations for corrective action, as appropriate. (ANNEX
4)
4. (U) LTG Sanchez's request
to investigate the 800th MP Brigade followed the initiation of
a criminal investigation by the US Army Criminal Investigation
Command (USACIDC) into specific allegations of detainee abuse
committed by members of the 372nd MP Company, 320th MP Battalion
in Iraq. These units are part of the 800th MP Brigade. The Brigade
is an Iraq Theater asset, TACON to CJTF-7, but OPCON to CFLCC
at the time this investigation was initiated. In addition, CJTF-7
had several reports of detainee escapes from US/Coalition Confinement
Facilities in Iraq over the past several months. These include
Camp Bucca, Camp Ashraf, Abu Ghraib, and the High Value Detainee
(HVD) Complex/Camp Cropper. The 800th MP Brigade operated these
facilities. In addition, four Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion
had been formally charged under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) with detainee abuse in May 2003 at the Theater
Internment Facility (TIF) at Camp Bucca, Iraq. (ANNEXES 5-18,
34 and 35)
5. (U) I began assembling my
investigation team prior to the actual appointment by the CFLCC
Commander. I assembled subject matter experts from the CFLCC
Provost Marshal (PM) and the CFLCC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA).
I selected COL Kinard J. La Fate, CFLCC Provost Marshal to be
my Deputy for this investigation. I also contacted the Provost
Marshal General of the Army, MG Donald J. Ryder, to enlist the
support of MP subject matter experts in the areas of detention
and internment operations. (ANNEXES 4 and 19)
6. (U) The Investigating Team
also reviewed the Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation
and Detention Operations in Iraq conducted by MG Geoffrey D.
Miller, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). From
31 August to 9 September 2003, MG Miller led a team of personnel
experienced in strategic interrogation to HQ, CJTF-7 and the
Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) to review current Iraqi Theater ability
to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence. MG
Miller's team focused on three areas: intelligence integration,
synchronization, and fusion; interrogation operations; and detention
operations. MG Miller's team used JTF-GTMO procedures and interrogation
authorities as baselines. (ANNEX 20)
7. (U) The Investigating Team
began its inquiry with an in-depth analysis of the Report on
Detention and Corrections in Iraq, dated 5 November 2003, conducted
by MG Ryder and a team of military police, legal, medical, and
automation experts. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, had previously
requested a team of subject matter experts to assess, and make
specific recommendations concerning detention and corrections
operations. From 13 October to 6 November 2003, MG Ryder personally
led this assessment/assistance team in Iraq. (ANNEX 19)
ASSESSMENT OF DoD COUNTER-TERRORISM
INTERROGATION AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ (MG MILLER'S ASSESSMENT)
1. (S/NF) The principal focus
of MG Miller's team was on the strategic interrogation of detainees/internees
in Iraq. Among its conclusions in its Executive Summary were
that CJTF-7 did not have authorities and procedures in place
to affect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate, and report
information from detainees/internees in Iraq. The Executive Summary
also stated that detention operations must act as an enabler
for interrogation. (ANNEX 20)
2. (S/NF) With respect to interrogation,
MG Miller's Team recommended that CJTF-7 dedicate and train a
detention guard force subordinate to the Joint Interrogation
Debriefing Center (JIDC) Commander that "sets the conditions
for the successful interrogation and exploitation of internees/detainees."
Regarding Detention Operations, MG Miller's team stated that
the function of Detention Operations is to provide a safe, secure,
and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection
of intelligence. However, it also stated "it is essential
that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions
for successful exploitation of the internees." (ANNEX 20)
3. (S/NF) MG Miller's team
also concluded that Joint Strategic Interrogation Operations
(within CJTF-7) are hampered by lack of active control of the
internees within the detention environment. The Miller Team also
stated that establishment of the Theater Joint Interrogation
and Detention Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) will consolidate
both detention and strategic interrogation operations and result
in synergy between MP and MI resources and an integrated, synchronized,
and focused strategic interrogation effort. (ANNEX 20)
4. (S/NF) MG Miller's team
also observed that the application of emerging strategic interrogation
strategies and techniques contain new approaches and operational
art. The Miller Team also concluded that a legal review and recommendations
on internee interrogation operations by a dedicated Command Judge
Advocate is required to maximize interrogation effectiveness.
(ANNEX 20)
IO COMMENTS ON MG MILLER'S
ASSESSMENT
1. (S/NF) MG Miller's team
recognized that they were using JTF-GTMO operational procedures
and interrogation authorities as baselines for its observations
and recommendations. There is a strong argument that the intelligence
value of detainees held at JTF-Guantanamo (GTMO) is different
than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
and other detention facilities in Iraq. Currently, there are
a large number of Iraqi criminals held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
These are not believed to be international terrorists or members
of Al Qaida, Anser Al Islam, Taliban, and other international
terrorist organizations. (ANNEX 20)
2. (S/NF) The recommendations
of MG Miller's team that the "guard force" be actively
engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation
of the internees would appear to be in conflict with the recommendations
of MG Ryder's Team and AR 190-8 that military police "do
not participate in military intelligence supervised interrogation
sessions." The Ryder Report concluded that the OEF template
whereby military police actively set the favorable conditions
for subsequent interviews runs counter to the smooth operation
of a detention facility. (ANNEX 20)
REPORT ON DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS
IN IRAQ (MG RYDER'S REPORT)
1. (U) MG Ryder and his assessment
team conducted a comprehensive review of the entire detainee
and corrections system in Iraq and provided recommendations addressing
each of the following areas as requested by the Commander CJTF-7:
a. (U) Detainee and corrections
system management
b. (U) Detainee management,
including detainee movement, segregation, and accountability
c. (U) Means of command and
control of the detention and corrections system
d. (U) Integration of military
detention and corrections with the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) and adequacy of plans for transition to an Iraqi-run corrections
system
e. (U) Detainee medical care
and health management
f. (U) Detention facilities
that meet required health, hygiene, and sanitation standards
g. (U) Court integration and
docket management for criminal detainees
h. (U) Detainee legal processing
i. (U) Detainee databases and
records, including integration with law enforcement and court
databases (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Many of the findings
and recommendations of MG Ryder's team are beyond the scope of
this investigation. However, several important findings are clearly
relevant to this inquiry and are summarized below (emphasis is
added in certain areas):
A. (U) Detainee Management
(including movement, segregation, and accountability)
1. (U) There is a wide variance
in standards and approaches at the various detention facilities.
Several Division/Brigade collection points and US monitored Iraqi
prisons had flawed or insufficiently detailed use of force and
other standing operating procedures or policies (e.g. weapons
in the facility, improper restraint techniques, detainee management,
etc.) Though, there were no military police units purposely applying
inappropriate confinement practices. (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Currently, due to lack
of adequate Iraqi facilities, Iraqi criminals (generally Iraqi-on-Iraqi
crimes) are detained with security internees (generally Iraqi-on-Coalition
offenses) and EPWs in the same facilities, though segregated
in different cells/compounds. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) The management of multiple
disparate groups of detained people in a single location by members
of the same unit invites confusion about handling, processing,
and treatment, and typically facilitates the transfer of information
between different categories of detainees. (ANNEX 19)
4. (U) The 800th MP (I/R) units
did not receive Internment/Resettlement (I/R) and corrections
specific training during their mobilization period. Corrections
training is only on the METL of two MP (I/R) Confinement Battalions
throughout the Army, one currently serving in Afghanistan, and
elements of the other are at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. MP units supporting
JTF-GTMO received ten days of training in detention facility
operations, to include two days of unarmed self-defense, training
in interpersonal communication skills, forced cell moves, and
correctional officer safety. (ANNEX 19)
B. (U) Means of Command and
Control of the Detention and Corrections System
1. (U) The 800th MP Brigade
was originally task organized with eight MP(I/R) Battalions consisting
of both MP Guard and Combat Support companies. Due to force rotation
plans, the 800th redeployed two Battalion HHCs in December 2003,
the 115th MP Battalion and the 324th MP Battalion. In December
2003, the 400th MP Battalion was relieved of its mission and
redeployed in January 2004. The 724thMP Battalion redeployed
on 11 February 2004 and the remainder is scheduled to redeploy
in March and April 2004. They are the 310th MP Battalion, 320th
MP Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion. The
units that remain are generally understrength, as Reserve Component
units do not have an individual personnel replacement system
to mitigate medical losses or the departure of individual Soldiers
that have reached 24 months of Federal active duty in a five-year
period. (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) The 800thMP Brigade
(I/R) is currently a CFLCC asset, TACON to CJTF-7 to conduct
Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations in Iraq. All detention
operations are conducted in the CJTF-7 AO; Camps Ganci, Vigilant,
Bucca, TSP Whitford, and a separate High Value Detention (HVD)
site. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) The 800th MP Brigade
has experienced challenges adapting its task organizational structure,
training, and equipment resources from a unit designed to conduct
standard EPW operations in the COMMZ (Kuwait). Further, the doctrinally
trained MP Soldier-to-detainee population ratio and facility
layout templates are predicated on a compliant, self-disciplining
EPW population, and not criminals or high-risk security internees.
(ANNEX 19)
4. (U) EPWs and Civilian Internees
should receive the full protections of the Geneva Conventions,
unless the denial of these protections is due to specifically
articulated military necessity (e.g., no visitation to preclude
the direction of insurgency operations). (ANNEXES 19 and 24)
5. (U) AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners
of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and other Detainees,
FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment and Resettlement Operations,
and FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations, require military police
to provide an area for intelligence collection efforts within
EPW facilities. Military Police, though adept at passive collection
of intelligence within a facility, do not participate in Military
Intelligence supervised interrogation sessions. Recent intelligence
collection in support of Operation Enduring Freedom posited a
template whereby military police actively set favorable conditions
for subsequent interviews. Such actions generally run counter
to the smooth operation of a detention facility, attempting to
maintain its population in a compliant and docile state. The
800th MP Brigade has not been directed to change its facility
procedures to set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor participate
in those interrogations. (ANNEXES 19 and 21-23)
6. MG Ryder's Report also made
the following, inter alia, near-term and mid-term recommendations
regarding the command and control of detainees:
a. (U) Align the release process
for security internees with DoD Policy. The process of screening
security internees should include intelligence findings, interrogation
results, and current threat assessment.
b. (U) Determine the scope
of intelligence collection that will occur at Camp Vigilant.
Refurbish the Northeast Compound to separate the screening operation
from the Iraqi run Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. Establish
procedures that define the role of military police Soldiers securing
the compound, clearly separating the actions of the guards from
those of the military intelligence personnel.
c. (U) Consolidate all Security
Internee Operations, except the MEK security mission, under a
single Military Police Brigade Headquarters for OIF 2.
d. (U) Insist that all units
identified to rotate into the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO)
to conduct internment and confinement operations in support of
OIF 2 be organic to CJTF-7. (ANNEX 19)
IO COMMENTS REGARDING MG RYDER'S
REPORT
1. (U) The objective of MG
Ryder's Team was to observe detention and prison operations,
identify potential systemic and human rights issues, and provide
near-term, mid-term, and long-term recommendations to improve
CJTF-7 operations and transition of the Iraqi prison system from
US military control/oversight to the Coalition Provisional Authority
and eventually to the Iraqi Government. The Findings and Recommendations
of MG Ryder's Team are thorough and precise and should be implemented
immediately. (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Unfortunately, many
of the systemic problems that surfaced during MG Ryder's Team's
assessment are the very same issues that are the subject of this
investigation. In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees
occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment. As
will be pointed out in detail in subsequent portions of this
report, I disagree with the conclusion of MG Ryder's Team in
one critical aspect, that being its conclusion that the 800th
MP Brigade had not been asked to change its facility procedures
to set the conditions for MI interviews. While clearly the 800th
MP Brigade and its commanders were not tasked to set conditions
for detainees for subsequent MI interrogations, it is obvious
from a review of comprehensive CID interviews of suspects and
witnesses that this was done at lower levels. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) I concur fully with
MG Ryder's conclusion regarding the effect of AR 190-8. Military
Police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence within
a facility, should not participate in Military Intelligence supervised
interrogation sessions. Moreover, Military Police should not
be involved with setting "favorable conditions" for
subsequent interviews. These actions, as will be outlined in
this investigation, clearly run counter to the smooth operation
of a detention facility. (ANNEX 19)
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS
1. (U) Following our review
of MG Ryder's Report and MG Miller's Report, my investigation
team immediately began an in-depth review of all available documents
regarding the 800th MP Brigade. We reviewed in detail the voluminous
CID investigation regarding alleged detainee abuses at detention
facilities in Iraq, particularly the Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention
Facility. We analyzed approximately fifty witness statements
from military police and military intelligence personnel, potential
suspects, and detainees. We reviewed numerous photos and videos
of actual detainee abuse taken by detention facility personnel,
which are now in the custody and control of the US Army Criminal
Investigation Command and the CJTF-7 prosecution team. The photos
and videos are not contained in this investigation. We obtained
copies of the 800th MP Brigade roster, rating chain, and assorted
internal investigations and disciplinary actions involving that
command for the past several months. (All ANNEXES Reviewed by
Investigation Team)
2. (U) In addition to military
police and legal officers from the CFLCC PMO and SJA Offices
we also obtained the services of two individuals who are experts
in military police detention practices and training. These were
LTC Timothy Weathersbee, Commander, 705th MP Battalion, United
States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, and SFC Edward
Baldwin, Senior Corrections Advisor, US Army Military Police
School, Fort Leonard Wood. I also requested and received the
services of Col (Dr) Henry Nelson, a trained US Air Force psychiatrist
assigned to assist my investigation team. (ANNEX 4)
3. (U) In addition to MG Ryder's
and MG Miller's Reports, the team reviewed numerous reference
materials including the 12 October 2003 CJTF-7 Interrogation
and Counter-Resistance Policy, the AR 15-6 Investigation on Riot
and Shootings at Abu Ghraib on 24 November 2003, the 205thMI
Brigade's Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), facility
staff logs/journals and numerous records of AR 15-6 investigations
and Serious Incident Reports (SIRs) on detainee escapes/shootings
and disciplinary matters from the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEXES
5-20, 37, 93, and 94)
4. (U) On 2 February 2004,
I took my team to Baghdad for a one-day inspection of the Abu
Ghraib Prison (BCCF) and the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex
in order to become familiar with those facilities. We also met
with COL Jerry Mocello, Commander, 3rd MP Criminal Investigation
Group (CID), COL Dave Quantock, Commander, 16th MP Brigade, COL
Dave Phillips, Commander, 89th MP Brigade, and COL Ed Sannwaldt,
CJTF-7 Provost Marshal. On 7 February 2004, the team visited
the Camp Bucca Detention Facility to familiarize itself with
the facility and operating structure. In addition, on 6 and 7
February 2004, at Camp Doha, Kuwait, we conducted extensive training
sessions on approved detention practices. We continued our preparation
by reviewing the ongoing CID investigation and were briefed by
the Special Agent in Charge, CW2 Paul Arthur. We refreshed ourselves
on the applicable reference materials within each team member's
area of expertise, and practiced investigative techniques. I
met with the team on numerous occasions to finalize appropriate
witness lists, review existing witness statements, arrange logistics,
and collect potential evidence. We also coordinated with CJTF-7
to arrange witness attendance, force protection measures, and
general logistics for the team's move to Baghdad on 8 February
2004. (ANNEXES 4 and 25)
5. (U) At the same time, due
to the Transfer of Authority on 1 February 2004 between III Corps
and V Corps, and the upcoming demobilization of the 800th MP
Brigade Command, I directed that several critical witnesses who
were preparing to leave the theater remain at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait
until they could be interviewed (ANNEX 29). My team deployed
to Baghdad on 8 February 2004 and conducted a series of interviews
with a variety of witnesses (ANNEX 30). We returned to Camp Doha,
Kuwait on 13 February 2004. On 14 and 15 February we interviewed
a number of witnesses from the 800th MP Brigade. On 17 February
we returned to Camp Bucca, Iraq to complete interviews of witnesses
at that location. From 18 February thru 28 February we collected
documents, compiled references, did follow-up interviews, and
completed a detailed analysis of the volumes of materials accumulated
throughout our investigation. On 29 February we finalized our
executive summary and out-briefing slides. On 9 March we submitted
the AR 15-6 written report with findings and recommendations
to the CFLCC Deputy SJA, LTC Mark Johnson, for a legal sufficiency
review. The out-brief to the appointing authority, LTG McKiernan,
took place on 3 March 2004. (ANNEXES 26 and 45-91)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART ONE)
(U) The investigation should
inquire into all of the facts and circumstances surrounding recent
allegations of detainee abuse, specifically, allegations of maltreatment
at the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility).
1. (U) The US Army Criminal
Investigation Command (CID), led by COL Jerry Mocello, and a
team of highly trained professional agents have done a superb
job of investigating several complex and extremely disturbing
incidents of detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Prison. They conducted
over 50 interviews of witnesses, potential criminal suspects,
and detainees. They also uncovered numerous photos and videos
portraying in graphic detail detainee abuse by Military Police
personnel on numerous occasions from October to December 2003.
Several potential suspects rendered full and complete confessions
regarding their personal involvement and the involvement of fellow
Soldiers in this abuse. Several potential suspects invoked their
rights under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) and the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (ANNEX
25)
2. (U) In addition to a comprehensive
and exhaustive review of all of these statements and documentary
evidence, we also interviewed numerous officers, NCOs, and junior
enlisted Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade, as well as members
of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade working at the prison.
We did not believe it was necessary to re-interview all the numerous
witnesses who had previously provided comprehensive statements
to CID, and I have adopted those statements for the purposes
of this investigation. (ANNEXES 26, 34, 35, and 45-91)
REGARDING PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION,
I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. (U) That Forward Operating
Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib (BCCF) provides security of both criminal
and security detainees at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility,
facilitates the conducting of interrogations for CJTF-7, supports
other CPA operations at the prison, and enhances the force protection/quality
of life of Soldiers assigned in order to ensure the success of
ongoing operations to secure a free Iraq. (ANNEX 31)
2. (U) That the Commander,
205th Military Intelligence Brigade, was designated by CJTF-7
as the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF) effective 19 November
2003. That the 205th MI Brigade conducts operational and strategic
interrogations for CJTF-7. That from 19 November 2003 until Transfer
of Authority (TOA) on 6 February 2004, COL Thomas M. Pappas was
the Commander of the 205th MI Brigade and the Commander of FOB
Abu Ghraib (BCCF). (ANNEX 31)
3. (U) That the 320th Military
Police Battalion of the 800th MP Brigade is responsible for the
Guard Force at Camp Ganci, Camp Vigilant, & Cellblock 1 of
FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). That from February 2003 to until he was
suspended from his duties on 17 January 2004, LTC Jerry Phillabaum
served as the Battalion Commander of the 320th MP Battalion.
That from December 2002 until he was suspended from his duties,
on 17 January 2004, CPT Donald Reese served as the Company Commander
of the 372ndMP Company, which was in charge of guarding detainees
at FOB Abu Ghraib. I further find that both the 320th MP Battalion
and the 372ndMP Company were located within the confines of FOB
Abu Ghraib. (ANNEXES 32 and 45)
4. (U) That from July of 2003
to the present, BG Janis L. Karpinski was the Commander of the
800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 45)
5. (S) That between October
and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib Confinement Facility (BCCF),
numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal
abuses were inflicted on several detainees. This systemic and
illegal abuse of detainees was intentionally perpetrated by several
members of the military police guard force (372nd Military Police
Company, 320thMilitary Police Battalion, 800th MP Brigade), in
Tier (section) 1-A of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF). The allegations
of abuse were substantiated by detailed witness statements (ANNEX
26) and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence.
Due to the extremely sensitive nature of these photographs and
videos, the ongoing CID investigation, and the potential for
the criminal prosecution of several suspects, the photographic
evidence is not included in the body of my investigation. The
pictures and videos are available from the Criminal Investigative
Command and the CTJF-7 prosecution team. In addition to the aforementioned
crimes, there were also abuses committed by members of the 325th
MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade, and Joint Interrogation and Debriefing
Center (JIDC). Specifically, on 24 November 2003, SPC Luciana
Spencer, 205th MI Brigade, sought to degrade a detainee by having
him strip and returned to cell naked. (ANNEXES 26 and 53)
6. (S) I find that the intentional
abuse of detainees by military police personnel included the
following acts:
a. (S) Punching, slapping,
and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet;
b. (S) Videotaping and photographing
naked male and female detainees;
c. (S) Forcibly arranging detainees
in various sexually explicit positions for photographing;
d. (S) Forcing detainees to
remove their clothing and keeping them naked for several days
at a time;
e. (S) Forcing naked male detainees
to wear women's underwear;
f. (S) Forcing groups of male
detainees to masturbate themselves while being photographed and
videotaped;
g. (S) Arranging naked male
detainees in a pile and then jumping on them;
h. (S) Positioning a naked
detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on his head, and attaching
wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture;
i. (S) Writing "I am a
Rapest" (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged to have forcibly
raped a 15-year old fellow detainee, and then photographing him
naked;
j. (S) Placing a dog chain
or strap around a naked detainee's neck and having a female Soldier
pose for a picture;
k. (S) A male MP guard having
sex with a female detainee;
l. (S) Using military working
dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and frighten detainees,
and in at least one case biting and severely injuring a detainee;
m. (S) Taking photographs of
dead Iraqi detainees.
(ANNEXES 25 and 26)
7.(U) These findings are amply
supported by written confessions provided by several of the suspects,
written statements provided by detainees, and witness statements.
In reaching my findings, I have carefully considered the pre-existing
statements of the following witnesses and suspects (ANNEX 26):
a. (U) SPC Jeremy Sivits, 372nd
MP Company - Suspect
b. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman,
372nd MP Company - Suspect
c. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis,
372nd MP Company - Suspect
c. (U) PFC Lynndie R. England,
372nd MP Company - Suspect
d. (U) Adel Nakhla, Civilian
Translator, Titan Corp., Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade- Suspect
(Names deleted)
8. (U) In addition, several
detainees also described the following acts of abuse, which under
the circumstances, I find credible based on the clarity of their
statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses
(ANNEX 26):
a. (U) Breaking chemical lights
and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees;
b. (U) Threatening detainees
with a charged 9mm pistol;
c. (U) Pouring cold water on
naked detainees;
d. (U) Beating detainees with
a broom handle and a chair;
e. (U) Threatening male detainees
with rape;
f. (U) Allowing a military
police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured
after being slammed against the wall in his cell;
g. (U) Sodomizing a detainee
with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick.
h. (U) Using military working
dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack,
and in one instance actually biting a detainee.
9. (U) I have carefully considered
the statements provided by the following detainees, which under
the circumstances I find credible based on the clarity of their
statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses:
a. (U) Amjed Isail Waleed,
Detainee # 151365
b. (U) Hiadar Saber Abed Miktub-Aboodi,
Detainee # 13077
c. (U) Huessin Mohssein Al-Zayiadi,
Detainee # 19446
d. (U) Kasim Mehaddi Hilas,
Detainee # 151108
e. (U) Mohanded Juma Juma (sic),
Detainee # 152307
f. (U) Mustafa Jassim Mustafa,
Detainee # 150542
g. (U) Shalan Said Alsharoni,
Detainee, # 150422
h. (U) Abd Alwhab Youss, Detainee
# 150425
i. (U) Asad Hamza Hanfosh,
Detainee # 152529
j. (U) Nori Samir Gunbar Al-Yasseri,
Detainee # 7787
k. (U) Thaar Salman Dawod,
Detainee # 150427
l. (U) Ameen Sa'eed Al-Sheikh,
Detainee # 151362
m. (U) Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh,
Detainee # 18470 (ANNEX 26)
10. (U) I find that contrary
to the provision of AR 190-8, and the findings found in MG Ryder's
Report, Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators and Other US
Government Agency's (OGA) interrogators actively requested that
MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation
of witnesses. Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder's Report,
I find that personnel assigned to the 372ndMP Company, 800th
MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures to "set
the conditions" for MI interrogations. I find no direct
evidence that MP personnel actually participated in those MI
interrogations. (ANNEXES 19, 21, 25, and 26).
11. (U) I reach this finding
based on the actual proven abuse that I find was inflicted on
detainees and by the following witness statements. (ANNEXES 25
and 26):
a. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman,
372nd MP Company, stated in her sworn statement regarding the
incident where a detainee was placed on a box with wires attached
to his fingers, toes, and penis, "that her job was to keep
detainees awake." She stated that MI was talking to CPL
Grainer. She stated: "MI wanted to get them to talk. It
is Grainer and Frederick's job to do things for MI and OGA to
get these people to talk."
b. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis,
372nd MP Company, stated in his sworn statement as follows: "I
witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section, wing 1A being made
to do various things that I would question morally. In Wing 1A
we were told that they had different rules and different SOP
for treatment. I never saw a set of rules or SOP for that section
just word of mouth. The Soldier in charge of 1A was Corporal
Granier. He stated that the Agents and MI Soldiers would ask
him to do things, but nothing was ever in writing he would complain
(sic)." When asked why the rules in 1A/1B were different
than the rest of the wings, SGT Davis stated: "The rest
of the wings are regular prisoners and 1A/B are Military Intelligence
(MI) holds." When asked why he did not inform his chain
of command about this abuse, SGT Davis stated: " Because
I assumed that if they were doing things out of the ordinary
or outside the guidelines, someone would have said something.
Also the wing belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved
of the abuse." SGT Davis also stated that he had heard MI
insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When asked what
MI said he stated: "Loosen this guy up for us." Make
sure he has abad night." "Make sure he gets the treatment."
He claimed these comments were made to CPL Granier and SSG Frederick.
Finally, SGT Davis stated that (sic): "the MI staffs to
my understanding have been giving Granier compliments on the
way he has been handling the MI holds. Example being statements
like, "Good job, they're breaking down real fast. They answer
every question. They're giving out good information, Finally,
and Keep up the good work . Stuff like that."
c. (U) SPC Jason Kennel, 372nd
MP Company, was asked if he were present when any detainees were
abused. He stated: "I saw them nude, but MI would tell us
to take away their mattresses, sheets, and clothes." He
could not recall who in MI had instructed him to do this, but
commented that, "if they wanted me to do that they needed
to give me paperwork." He was later informed that "we
could not do anything to embarrass the prisoners."
d. (U) Mr. Adel L. Nakhla,
a US civilian contract translator was questioned about several
detainees accused of rape. He observed (sic): "They (detainees)
were all naked, a bunch of people from MI, the MP were there
that night and the inmates were ordered by SGT Granier and SGT
Frederick ordered the guys while questioning them to admit what
they did. They made them do strange exercises by sliding on their
stomach, jump up and down, throw water on them and made them
some wet, called them all kinds of names such as "gays"
do they like to make love to guys, then they handcuffed their
hands together and their legs with shackles and started to stack
them on top of each other by insuring that the bottom guys penis
will touch the guy on tops butt."
e. (U) SPC Neil A Wallin, 109th
Area Support Medical Battalion, a medic testified that: "Cell
1A was used to house high priority detainees and cell 1B was
used to house the high risk or trouble making detainees. During
my tour at the prison I observed that when the male detainees
were first brought to the facility, some of them were made to
wear female underwear, which I think was to somehow break them
down."
12. (U) I find that prior to
its deployment to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 320th
MP Battalion and the 372nd MP Company had received no training
in detention/internee operations. I also find that very little
instruction or training was provided to MP personnel on the applicable
rules of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, FM 27-10, AR 190-8, or FM 3-19.40. Moreover, I find that
few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were ever made
available to MP personnel or detainees. (ANNEXES 21-24, 33, and
multiple witness statements)
13.(U) Another obvious example
of the Brigade Leadership not communicating with its Soldiers
or ensuring their tactical proficiency concerns the incident
of detainee abuse that occurred at Camp Bucca, Iraq, on May 12,
2003. Soldiers from the 223rd MP Company reported to the 800th
MP Brigade Command at Camp Bucca, that four Military Police Soldiers
from the 320th MP Battalion had abused a number of detainees
during inprocessing at Camp Bucca. An extensive CID investigation
determined that four soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had
kicked and beaten these detainees following a transport mission
from Talil Air Base. (ANNEXES 34 and 35)
14. (U) Formal charges under
the UCMJ were preferred against these Soldiers and an Article-32
Investigation conducted by LTC Gentry. He recommended a general
court martial for the four accused, which BG Karpinski supported.
Despite this documented abuse, there is no evidence that BG Karpinski
ever attempted to remind 800th MP Soldiers of the requirements
of the Geneva Conventions regarding detainee treatment or took
any steps to ensure that such abuse was not repeated. Nor is
there any evidence that LTC(P) Phillabaum, the commander of the
Soldiers involved in the Camp Bucca abuse incident, took any
initiative to ensure his Soldiers were properly trained regarding
detainee treatment. (ANNEXES 35 and 62)
RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART
ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION:
1. (U) Immediately deploy to
the Iraq Theater an integrated multi-discipline Mobile Training
Team (MTT) comprised of subject matter experts in internment/resettlement
operations, international and operational law, information technology,
facility management, interrogation and intelligence gathering
techniques, chaplains, Arab cultural awareness, and medical practices
as it pertains to I/R activities. This team needs to oversee
and conduct comprehensive training in all aspects of detainee
and confinement operations.
2. (U) That all military police
and military intelligence personnel involved in any aspect of
detainee operations or interrogation operations in CJTF-7, and
subordinate units, be immediately provided with training by an
international/operational law attorney on the specific provisions
of The Law of Land Warfare FM 27-10, specifically the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Enemy
Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and
Other Detainees, and AR 190-8.
3. (U) That a single commander
in CJTF-7 be responsible for overall detainee operations throughout
the Iraq Theater of Operations. I also recommend that the Provost
Marshal General of the Army assign a minimum of two (2) subject
matter experts, one officer and one NCO, to assist CJTF-7 in
coordinating detainee operations.
4. (U) That detention facility
commanders and interrogation facility commanders ensure that
appropriate copies of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War and notice of protections be made available
in both English and the detainees' language and be prominently
displayed in all detention facilities. Detainees with questions
regarding their treatment should be given the full opportunity
to read the Convention.
5. (U) That each detention
facility commander and interrogation facility commander publish
a complete and comprehensive set of Standing Operating Procedures
(SOPs) regarding treatment of detainees, and that all personnel
be required to read the SOPs and sign a document indicating that
they have read and understand the SOPs.
6. (U) That in accordance with
the recommendations of MG Ryder's Assessment Report, and my findings
and recommendations in this investigation, all units in the Iraq
Theater of Operations conducting internment/confinement/detainment
operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom be OPCON for
all purposes, to include action under the UCMJ, to CJTF-7.
7. (U) Appoint the C3, CJTF
as the staff proponent for detainee operations in the Iraq Joint
Operations Area (JOA). (MG Tom Miller, C3, CJTF-7, has been appointed
by COMCJTF-7).
8. (U) That an inquiry UP AR
381-10, Procedure 15 be conducted to determine the extent of
culpability of Military Intelligence personnel, assigned to the
205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center
(JIDC) regarding abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
9. (U) That it is critical
that the proponent for detainee operations is assigned a dedicated
Senior Judge Advocate, with specialized training and knowledge
of international and operational law, to assist and advise on
matters of detainee operations.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART TWO)
(U) The Investigation inquire
into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by
CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these events at the
Abu Ghraib Prison:
REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION,
I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The 800th MP Brigade was
responsible for theater-wide Internment and Resettlement (I/R)
operations. (ANNEXES 45 and 95)
2. (U) The 320th MP Battalion,
800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee operations at the Abu
Ghraib Prison Complex during the time period covered in this
investigation. (ANNEXES 41, 45, and 59)
3. (U) The 310th MP Battalion,
800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee operations and Forward
Operating Base (FOB) Operations at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility
until TOA on 26 February 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 52)
4. (U) The 744th MP Battalion,
800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee operations and FOB
Operations at the HVD Detention Facility until TOA on 4 March
2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 55)
5. (U) The 530th MP Battalion,
800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee operations and FOB
Operations at the MEK holding facility until TOA on 15 March
2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 97)
6. (U) Detainee operations
include accountability, care, and well being of Enemy Prisoners
of War, Retained Person, Civilian Detainees, and Other Detainees,
as well as Iraqi criminal prisoners. (ANNEX 22)
7. (U) The accountability for
detainees is doctrinally an MP task IAW FM 3-19.40. (ANNEX 22)
8. (U) There is a general lack
of knowledge, implementation, and emphasis of basic legal, regulatory,
doctrinal, and command requirements within the 800th MP Brigade
and its subordinate units. (Multiple witness statements in ANNEXES
45-91).
9. (U) The handling of detainees
and criminal prisoners after in-processing was inconsistent from
detention facility to detention facility, compound to compound,
encampment to encampment, and even shift to shift throughout
the 800th MP Brigade AOR. (ANNEX 37)
10. (U) Camp Bucca, operated
by the 310th MP Battalion, had a "Criminal Detainee In-Processing
SOP" and a "Training Outline" for transferring
and releasing detainees, which appears to have been followed.
(ANNEXES 38 and 52)
11. (U) Incoming and outgoing
detainees are being documented in the National Detainee Reporting
System (NDRS) and Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS) as
required by regulation at all detention facilities. However,
it is underutilized and often does not give a "real time"
accurate picture of the detainee population due to untimely updating.
(ANNEX 56)
12. (U) There was a severe
lapse in the accountability of detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison
Complex. The 320th MP Battalion used a self-created "change
sheet" to document the transfer of a detainee from one location
to another. For proper accountability, it is imperative that
these change sheets be processed and the detainee manifest be
updated within 24 hours of movement. At Abu Ghraib, this process
would often take as long as 4 days to complete. This lag-time
resulted in inaccurate detainee Internment Serial Number (ISN)
counts, gross differences in the detainee manifest and the actual
occupants of an individual compound, and significant confusion
of the MP Soldiers. The 320th MP Battalion S-1, CPT Theresa Delbalso,
and the S-3, MAJ David DiNenna, explained that this breakdown
was due to the lack of manpower to process change sheets in a
timely manner. (ANNEXES 39 and 98)
13. (U) The 320th Battalion
TACSOP requires detainee accountability at least 4 times daily
at Abu Ghraib. However, a detailed review of their operational
journals revealed that these accounts were often not done or
not documented by the unit. Additionally, there is no indication
that accounting errors or the loss of a detainee in the accounting
process triggered any immediate corrective action by the Battalion
TOC. (ANNEX 44)
14. (U) There is a lack of
standardization in the way the 320th MP Battalion conducted physical
counts of their detainees. Each compound within a given encampment
did their headcounts differently. Some compounds had detainees
line up in lines of 10, some had them sit in rows, and some moved
all the detainees to one end of the compound and counted them
as they passed to the other end of the compound. (ANNEX 98)
15. (U) FM 3-19.40 outlines
the need for 2 roll calls (100% ISN band checks) per day. The
320th MP Battalion did this check only 2 times per week. Due
to the lack of real-time updates to the system, these checks
were regularly inaccurate. (ANNEXES 22 and 98)
16. (U) The 800th MP Brigade
and subordinate units adopted non-doctrinal terms such as "band
checks," "roll-ups," and "call-ups,"
which contributed to the lapses in accountability and confusion
at the soldier level. (Annexes 63, 88, and 98)
17. (U) Operational journals
at the various compounds and the 320th Battalion TOC contained
numerous unprofessional entries and flippant comments, which
highlighted the lack of discipline within the unit. There was
no indication that the journals were ever reviewed by anyone
in their chain of command. (Annex 37)
18. (U) Accountability SOPs
were not fully developed and standing TACSOPs were widely ignored.
Any SOPs that did exist were not trained on, and were never distributed
to the lowest level. Most procedures were shelved at the unit
TOC, rather than at the subordinate units and guards mount sites.
(Annexes 44, 67, 71, and 85)
19. (U) Accountability and
facility operations SOPs lacked specificity, implementation measures,
and a system of checks and balances to ensure compliance. (AnnexES
76 and 82)
20. (U) Basic Army Doctrine
was not widely referenced or utilized to develop the accountability
practices throughout the 800th MP Brigade's subordinate units.
Daily processing, accountability, and detainee care appears to
have been made up as the operations developed with reliance on,
and guidance from, junior members of the unit who had civilian
corrections experience. (Annex 21)
21. (U) Soldiers were poorly
prepared and untrained to conduct I/R operations prior to deployment,
at the mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and throughout
their mission. (ANNEXES 62, 63, and 69)
22. (U) The documentation provided
to this investigation identified 27 escapes or attempted escapes
from the detention facilities throughout the 800th MP Brigade's
AOR. Based on my assessment and detailed analysis of the substandard
accountability process maintained by the 800th MP Brigade, it
is highly likely that there were several more unreported cases
of escape that were probably "written off" as administrative
errors or otherwise undocumented. 1LT Lewis Raeder, Platoon Leader,
372nd MP Company, reported knowing about at least two additional
escapes (one from a work detail and one from a window) from Abu
Ghraib (BCCF) that were not documented. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander,
744th MP Battalion, detailed the escape of one detainee at the
High Value Detainee Facility who went to the latrine and then
outran the guards and escaped. Lastly, BG Janis Karpinski, Commander,
800th MP Brigade, stated that there were more than 32 escapes
from her holding facilities, which does not match the number
derived from the investigation materials. (ANNEXES 5-10, 45,
55, and 71)
23. (U) The Abu Ghraib and
Camp Bucca detention facilities are significantly over their
intended maximum capacity while the guard force is undermanned
and under resourced. This imbalance has contributed to the poor
living conditions, escapes, and accountability lapses at the
various facilities. The overcrowding of the facilities also limits
the ability to identify and segregate leaders in the detainee
population who may be organizing escapes and riots within the
facility. (ANNEXES 6, 22, and 92)
24. (U) The screening, processing,
and release of detainees who should not be in custody takes too
long and contributes to the overcrowding and unrest in the detention
facilities. There are currently three separate release mechanisms
in the theater-wide internment operations. First, the apprehending
unit can release a detainee if there is a determination that
their continued detention is not warranted. Secondly, a criminal
detainee can be released after it has been determined that the
detainee has no intelligence value, and that their release would
not be detrimental to society. BG Karpinski had signature authority
to release detainees in this second category. Lastly, detainees
accused of committing "Crimes Against the Coalition,"
who are held throughout the separate facilities in the CJTF-7
AOR, can be released upon a determination that they are of no
intelligence value and no longer pose a significant threat to
Coalition Forces. The release process for this category of detainee
is a screening by the local US Forces Magistrate Cell and a review
by a Detainee Release Board consisting of BG Karpinski, COL Marc
Warren, SJA, CJTF-7, and MG Barbara Fast, C-2, CJTF-7. MG Fast
is the "Detainee Release Authority" for detainees being
held for committing crimes against the coalition. According to
BG Karpinski, this category of detainee makes up more than 60%
of the total detainee population, and is the fastest growing
category. However, MG Fast, according to BG Karpinski, routinely
denied the board's recommendations to release detainees in this
category who were no longer deemed a threat and clearly met the
requirements for release. According to BG Karpinski, the extremely
slow and ineffective release process has significantly contributed
to the overcrowding of the facilities. (ANNEXES 40, 45, and 46)
25. (U) After Action Reviews
(AARs) are not routinely being conducted after an escape or other
serious incident. No lessons learned seem to have been disseminated
to subordinate units to enable corrective action at the lowest
level. The Investigation Team requested copies of AARs, and none
were provided. (Multiple Witness Statements)
26. (U) Lessons learned (i.e.
Findings and Recommendations from various 15-6 Investigations
concerning escapes and accountability lapses) were rubber stamped
as approved and ordered implemented by BG Karpinski. There is
no evidence that the majority of her orders directing the implementation
of substantive changes were ever acted upon. Additionally, there
was no follow-up by the command to verify the corrective actions
were taken. Had the findings and recommendations contained within
their own investigations been analyzed and actually implemented
by BG Karpinski, many of the subsequent escapes, accountability
lapses, and cases of abuse may have been prevented. (ANNEXES
5-10)
27. (U) The perimeter lighting
around Abu Ghraib and the detention facility at Camp Bucca is
inadequate and needs to be improved to illuminate dark areas
that have routinely become avenues of escape. (ANNEX 6)
28. (U) Neither the camp rules
nor the provisions of the Geneva Conventions are posted in English
or in the language of the detainees at any of the detention facilities
in the 800th MP Brigade's AOR, even after several investigations
had annotated the lack of this critical requirement. (Multiple
Witness Statements and the Personal Observations of the Investigation
Team)
29. (U) The Iraqi guards at
Abu Ghraib BCCF) demonstrate questionable work ethics and loyalties,
and are a potentially dangerous contingent within the Hard-Site.
These guards have furnished the Iraqi criminal inmates with contraband,
weapons, and information. Additionally, they have facilitated
the escape of at least one detainee. (ANNEX 8 and 26-SPC Polak's
Statement)
30. (U) In general, US civilian
contract personnel (Titan Corporation, CACI, etc...), third country
nationals, and local contractors do not appear to be properly
supervised within the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. During
our on-site inspection, they wandered about with too much unsupervised
free access in the detainee area. Having civilians in various
outfits (civilian and DCUs) in and about the detainee area causes
confusion and may have contributed to the difficulties in the
accountability process and with detecting escapes. (ANNEX 51,
Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of
the Investigation Team)
31. (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations
SGM, 320th MP Battalion, contended that the Detainee Rules of
Engagement (DROE) and the general principles of the Geneva Convention
were briefed at every guard mount and shift change on Abu Ghraib.
However, none of our witnesses, nor our personal observations,
support his contention. I find that SGM Emerson was not a credible
witness. (ANNEXES 45, 80, and the Personal Observations of the
Investigation Team)
32. (U) Several interviewees
insisted that the MP and MI Soldiers at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) received
regular training on the basics of detainee operations; however,
they have been unable to produce any verifying documentation,
sign-in rosters, or soldiers who can recall the content of this
training. (Annexes 59, 80, and the Absence of any Training Records)
33. (S/NF) The various detention
facilities operated by the 800th MP Brigade have routinely held
persons brought to them by Other Government Agencies (OGAs) without
accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason
for their detention. The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center
(JIDC) at Abu Ghraib called these detainees "ghost detainees."
On at least one occasion, the 320th MP Battalion at Abu Ghraib
held a handful of "ghost detainees" (6-8) for OGAs
that they moved around within the facility to hide them from
a visiting International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey
team. This maneuver was deceptive, contrary to Army Doctrine,
and in violation of international law. (Annex 53)
34. (U) The following riots,
escapes, and shootings have been documented and reported to this
Investigation Team. Although there is no data from other missions
of similar size and duration to compare the number of escapes
with, the most significant factors derived from these reports
are twofold. First, investigations and SIRs lacked critical data
needed to evaluate the details of each incident. Second, each
investigation seems to have pointed to the same types of deficiencies;
however, little to nothing was done to correct the problems and
to implement the recommendations as was ordered by BG Karpinski,
nor was there any command emphasis to ensure these deficiencies
were corrected:
a. (U) 4 June 03- This escape
was mentioned in the 15-6 Investigation covering the 13 June
03 escape, recapture, and shootings of detainees at Camp Vigilant
(320th MP Battalion). However, no investigation or additional
information was provided as requested by this investigation team.
(ANNEX 7)
b. (U) 9 June 03- Riot and
shootings of five detainees at Camp Cropper. (115th MP Battalion)
Several detainees allegedly rioted after a detainee was subdued
by MPs of the 115th MP Battalion after striking a guard in compound
B of Camp Cropper. A 15-6 investigation by 1LT Magowan (115th
MP Battalion, Platoon Leader) concluded that a detainee had acted
up and hit an MP. After being subdued, one of the MPs took off
his DCU top and flexed his muscles to the detainees, which further
escalated the riot. The MPs were overwhelmed and the guards fired
lethal rounds to protect the life of the compound MPs, whereby
5 detainees were wounded. Contributing factors were poor communications,
no clear chain of command, facility-obstructed views of posted
guards, the QRF did not have non-lethal equipment, and the SOP
was inadequate and outdated. (ANNEX 5)
c. (U) 12 June 03- Escape and
recapture of detainee #8399, escape and shooting of detainee
# 7166, and attempted escape of an unidentified detainee from
Camp Cropper Holding Area (115th MP Battalion). Several detainees
allegedly made their escape in the nighttime hours prior to 0300.
A 15-6 investigation by CPT Wendlandt (115th MP Battalion, S-2)
concluded that the detainees allegedly escaped by crawling under
the wire at a location with inadequate lighting. One detainee
was stopped prior to escape. An MP of the 115th MP Battalion
search team recaptured detainee # 8399, and detainee # 7166 was
shot and killed by a Soldier during the recapture process. Contributing
factors were overcrowding, poor lighting, and the nature of the
hardened criminal detainees at that location. It is of particular
note that the command was informed at least 24 hours in advance
of the upcoming escape attempt and started doing amplified announcements
in Arabic stating the camp rules. The investigation pointed out
that rules and guidelines were not posted in the camps in the
detainees' native languages. (ANNEX 6)
d. (U) 13 June 03- Escape and
recapture of detainee # 8968 and the shooting of eight detainees
at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees
allegedly attempted to escape at about 1400 hours from the Camp
Vigilant Compound, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). A 15-6 investigation by
CPT Wyks (400th MP Battalion, S-1) concluded that the detainee
allegedly escaped by sliding under the wire while the tower guard
was turned in the other direction. This detainee was subsequently
apprehended by the QRF. At about 1600 the same day, 30-40 detainees
rioted and pelted three interior MP guards with rocks. One guard
was injured and the tower guards fired lethal rounds at the rioters
injuring 7 and killing 1 detainee. (ANNEX 7)
e. (U) 05 November 03- Escape
of detainees # 9877 and # 10739 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion).
Several detainees allegedly escaped at 0345 from the Hard-Site,
Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SPC Warner (320th
MP Battalion, S-3 RTO). The SIR indicated that 2 criminal prisoners
escaped through their cell window in tier 3A of the Hard-Site.
No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective
action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 11)
f. (U) 07 November 03- Escape
of detainee # 14239 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee
allegedly escaped at 1330 from Compound 2 of the Ganci Encampment,
Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP
Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR indicated that a detainee
escaped from the North end of the compound and was discovered
missing during distribution of the noon meal, but there is no
method of escape listed in the SIR. No information on findings,
contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided
to this investigation team. (ANNEX 12)
g. (U) 08 November 03- Escape
of detainees # 115089, # 151623, # 151624, # 116734, # 116735,
and # 116738 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees
allegedly escaped at 2022 from Compound 8 of the Ganci encampment,
Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by MAJ DiNenna (320th MP Battalion,
S-3). The SIR indicated that 5-6 prisoners escaped from the North
end of the compound, but there is no method of escape listed
in the SIR. No information on findings, contributing factors,
or corrective action has been provided to this investigation
team. (ANNEX 13)
h. (U) 24 November 03- Riot
and shooting of 12 detainees # 150216, #150894, #153096, 153165,
#153169, #116361, #153399, #20257, #150348, #152616, #116146,
and #152156 at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees
allegedly began to riot at about 1300 in all of the compounds
at the Ganci encampment. This resulted in the shooting deaths
of 3 detainees, 9 wounded detainees, and 9 injured US Soldiers.
A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th MP Brigade,
Deputy Commander) concluded that the detainees rioted in protest
of their living conditions, that the riot turned violent, the
use of non-lethal force was ineffective, and, after the 320th
MP Battalion CDR executed "Golden Spike," the emergency
containment plan, the use of deadly force was authorized. Contributing
factors were lack of comprehensive training of guards, poor or
non-existent SOPs, no formal guard-mount conducted prior to shift,
no rehearsals or ongoing training, the mix of less than lethal
rounds with lethal rounds in weapons, no AARs being conducted
after incidents, ROE not posted and n |